Third parties intervene into ongoing civil wars frequently and at times with nefarious intentions. In this paper, we consider the possibility that lootable natural resources motivate third parties to intervene into wars to access natural resources, which offer a host of benefits to the intervener. When rebels have access to lootable resources, we posit that third parties will be more likely to intervene on the side of the rebels and simultaneously less likely to intervene on behalf of the government. Split population (mixture-cure) survival models, in conjunction with close attention to the dynamics of a number of individual cases, offer support for the theoretical argument, which is substantiated using different measures of lootable resources. This paper advances our understanding of the motivations for intervention into civil war by highlighting the oft-forgotten role of economic factors in motivating intervention. It further adds insights into the role of natural resources in civil wars by shifting emphasis away from domestic combatants towards the motives of outside states.
Introduction
Wamba Dia Wamba, former leader of a rebel group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (D.R.C.), admitted that both Uganda and Rwanda purposefully and extensively looted Congo's precious stones, gold, and timber (Willum 2001; Ross 2004b) . Although both Uganda and Rwanda have officially denied a link between resources and their decisions to intervene, estimates indicate that the two states obtained economic profits from the resources totaling hundreds of millions of dollars (Nest, et al 2006: 52-53, 69) , thus raising credible suspicions that resources were at the heart of the intervention decisions. Allegations of resource-motivated, third-party intervention such as these have permeated newspaper columns over the past fifteen years, yet strikingly little scholarly research considers this relationship. This raises the question of whether, more generally, natural resources in a country engulfed in civil war motivate third parties to intervene.
Research on intervention into civil wars spans a variety of third-party motivations, ranging from humanitarian to geopolitical factors (Licklider 1995; Rowlands 1998 Regan 2000; Findley and Teo 2006; Gent 2007) . With few exceptions (e.g., Fordham 2008) , extant research ignores the role of economic factors, especially natural resources. In this paper, we consider the role of "lootable resources", which are generally considered high-value resources in a market with low barriers to entry (Le Billon 2001; Snyder 2003; Ross 2004; Snyder and Bhavnani 2005) . Examples of lootable resources prominently include "alluvial" diamonds--located close to the surface in alluvial river plains--drugs, some precious timbers, as well as other precious stones, including gems, rubies, and sapphires.
Anecdotal evidence from countries as diverse as Afghanistan and Angola indicates that lootable resources may provide a key motivation for states deciding whether to intervene. And much is at stake when third parties intervene into civil wars. (War endings appear to take much longer, especially if ending in negotiated agreement (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000) . When third parties intervene on opposite sides of the conflict, furthermore, they tend to exacerbate the problems, causing the wars to last longer (Regan 2002) . And when wars end in military victories, they may occur much earlier than settlements (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008) .
We contend that lootable resources, because of their value and relative ease of access, provide several incentives for third parties to intervene into a civil war. A third party may desire access to raw lootable resources because it desires to enter or protect the market from which it profits, irrespective of war dynamics or outcome. The revenue obtained for the resources could also be used to fuel the war towards the intervener's desired outcome. Lastly, intervention generally should be more likely to occur if natural resources are available in the civil war zone because the third party has a better chance of obtaining access to the resources.
Access to the resources may indicate, furthermore, that the party controlling the resources could have a relative advantage, making an intervener more likely to intervene to support the winning side. Thus, potential interveners may carefully consider on which side of the war to intervene based on a number of factors including resources. Control of the resources might determine what proportion of the resources an intervener can expect to access and, related, how likely the intervener and the side it supports are to win the war. As lootable resources provide a source of additive support for opposition groups (Ross 2004b) , potential interveners should be more likely to support opposition groups if such groups have access to lootable resources.
To test the argument, we estimate a split-population (or mixture-cure) survival analysis of intervention into post-WWII civil wars based on Regan (2002) . We begin by estimating whether resources motivate third parties to intervene at all. A competing risks framework then allows us to distinguish between intervention on the side of the government from intervention in support of the opposition. The results offer support for the argument about intervention generally as well as about the side of intervention and indicate that lootable resources indeed motivate third-party intervention.
We pay close attention to the dynamics of a number of cases, which provide further insights into the mechanisms explaining intervention.
The paper proceeds by situating the research within the context of existing literature on third-party intervention with an emphasis on the motivations for intervention, and then elucidates the theoretical mechanisms underlying the lootable resource-intervention relationship. After providing an explanation of the research design, the paper considers the statistical results and case illustrations, which offer support for the theoretical argument. Finally, it concludes with a summary of the findings and a discussion of policy implications of the research.
Intervention and the Role of Natural Resources
The third-party intervention literature has boomed in recent years (e.g., Carment, James, and Rowlands 1997; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Regan 2000; Regan 2002 ). Attention to lootable resources and civil war has also been prominent. Possible linkages between the two have not been systematically explored thus far, however. And yet there are compelling reasons to suspect that lootable resources frequently motivate intervention.
The Decision to Intervene into Ongoing Civil Wars
Conventional wisdom suggests that third parties intervene into ongoing civil wars for humanitarian reasons and to resolve the underlying dispute driving the war (Licklider 1995; Carment and Rowlands 1998; Regan 2000) . To pretend that these factors do not matter would prove foolhardy.
But substantial recent evidence indicates that third-party political and strategic objectives are also powerful determinants of intervention decisions. Interventions occur to combat and drain the resources of rivalries, for example, especially if a rival has already intervened into the civil war (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2005; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Findley and Teo 2006; Gent 2007; Fordham 2008) . The U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War likely explains many of these interstate-rivalry interventions (Feste 1992; Scott 1996; Yoon 1997; Regan 2000; Mullenbach and Matthews 2008) .
Other political and strategic factors may be no less important. Democracies intervene abroad to protect their own interests (Peceny 1999) , major powers and those with a colonial past also tend to intervene more often (Lemke and Regan 2004) , and there is some evidence that interventions occur because of alliances (Smith 1996; Lemke and Regan 2004; Findley and Teo 2006) . More generally, third parties carefully weigh a host of costs and benefits, including the conflict's intensity, duration, success prospects, potential spillover, and electoral consequences that accrue from international, national, and subnational sources in deciding to intervene (Regan 2000; Pickering 2001; Regan 2002; Saideman 1997 , Kathman 2010 Enterline, Garrison, and Aubone 2009 ).
In spite of growing evidence about third-party motivations, existing studies are conspicuously devoid of economic arguments. Fordham (2008) argues that early work offered some evidence about the importance of economic factors (Odell 1974; Rosen 1974) , but subsequent research showed that the strategic factors were more important (Meernik 1994; Pearson and Baumann 1977; Yoon 1997) . Fordham (2008) examines the effects of economic interests (operationalized as exports) on U.S. interventions and finds an indirect effect through the formation of alliances. In a study on historical interventions, Aydin (2010) included economic factors, such as diamonds, gemstones, opiates, and oil as control variables, but did not emphasize them theoretically or empirically. Outside of these few studies, almost no recent work has considered economic motives for civil war intervention in a systematic way.
The neglect of economic factors is partly due to a shift in identifying and incorporating the side on which third parties intervene -the government vs. the opposition (Findley and Teo 2006; Gent 2007; Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008) . Economic variables, such as trade, do not easily differentiate the separate economic stakes or consequences for government and rebels.
Because governments and rebels vie for control of lootable natural resources, and some data exist about who controls them, we consider the effect of competing interventions on different sides of a conflict.
The dialogue on lootable resources and civil war tends to focus on the onset and duration of war, with only peripheral mention of how resources might affect third-party intervention (Ross 2004a (Ross , 2004b (Ross , 2006 Humphreys 2005) . This topic has not been explored in any depth theoretically, and no systematic empirical tests have been conducted to determine whether lootable resources motivate third-party intervention.
2 And yet the presence of lootable natural resources may provide strong incentives for third parties to enter a conflict, which we now consider in greater depth.
Lootable Resources as a Motive for Intervention
The 'lootability' of resources refers generally to resources that have high value but where the market poses low barriers to entry (Le Billon 2001; Snyder 2003; Ross 2004; Snyder and Bhavnani 2005) . In the study of civil war onset and duration, most emphasis has been placed on diamonds (especially alluvial), along with some other resources, such as drugs and timber. A state's supply of lootable natural resources presents an opportunity for third parties to intervene to profit from the resources. Non-lootable resources would be difficult to extract or support covertly, thus it is likely that third parties pay closer attention to lootable resources. But how specifically do lootable resources motivate intervention?
A third party may intervene to gain or maintain access to the extraction of a raw resource or to a market for the resource (Humphreys 2005) . Whether a state (1) had no previous access to the resources, (2) loses access at some point during the war, or (3) fears losing access because of warrelated events, a third party may choose to intervene in order to protect its interests in the resources or gain access before others do. Clearly there is a time element at play: the longer a war progresses, the more likely it is that resource access will be obstructed or another party will access them first, thus prompting third parties to be proactive about their interest in the resources.
Because lootable resources carry such high value and opening or continuing their flows is so profitable, third parties may be more apt to intervene in a timely fashion to benefit. A third-party state may use the revenues generated from the resources for a variety of purposes. It may even extract the resource revenues to be used for a variety of private and public activities unrelated to the war. To be sure, domestic combatants are not passive actors merely at the will of third parties. At A third party might also use revenues to fund the intervention itself and fuel the civil war towards a certain outcome beneficial to the third party. The benefit of the resources could cover the costs of intervention fully, or the resources might only partially offset costs, but in conjunction with other benefits, justify intervention. In the D.R.C. conflict of the late 1990s, it appears that Uganda's intervention reflects the non-war related motives, whereas Rwanda may have used the acquired resources primarily for fueling the war (Ross 2004b) . This leads to our first hypothesis:
H1: Third parties have a higher hazard of intervention into civil wars if lootable resources are present in the country and conflict zones.
Thus far, we have primarily considered how resources might motivate intervention into a war without specifying which side a third party is likely to support. This decision likely depends on a number of factors, such as ethnic affinities, relations between the intervener and civil war state, the involvement of other third parties, but also in our case: who controls the resources. Thus, while the presence of a resource should entice third parties to intervene, government or rebel control of the resources is likely a crucial consideration for the side on which intervention will occur.
Third parties hoping for a rebel victory or advantage face a dilemma: international norms of sovereignty place an immediate barrier in the way of those hoping to support opposition groups.
Clearly, opposition-biased interventions have occurred with some frequency, but they require much more justification or secrecy as they violate the international respect for state sovereignty.
Opposition-biased interventions, therefore, often occur at least semi-covertly so as to avoid or reduce international scrutiny, as the U.S. intervention into 1980s Afghanistan nicely illustrates.
It follows that if third parties need to support the opposition side stealthily, then they may wish to minimize the use of their own military resources and instead rely on revenues that accrue to rebels from lootable resources. Indeed, third parties likely recognize that they can support opposition groups more easily if they can fuel the lootable resource market and generate revenues for the war that way. The third party itself could benefit from the revenues, of course, but perhaps more importantly the revenue from the resources can confer additive capability on the opposition side. U.S. involvement in the Afghan war appears to have followed this pattern as the U.S. helped fuel the opium trade in order to fund the Mujahidin.
If rebels have access to lootable resources, furthermore, there is much less of an incentive for third parties to support the government side. If rebels control resources, then outside interveners face a more difficult challenge backing a government against an otherwise stronger opponent. The rebels in such a situation will have greater capabilities and may be more difficult to defeat in the war.
This discussion motivates our second hypothesis regarding the side on which intervention should occur:
H2: Third parties have a higher (lower) hazard of intervention on the opposition (government) side, if opposition groups have access to lootable resources.
We now turn to statistical tests and case study evidence to test these expectations.
Research Design
To understand the relationship between lootable resources and third party intervention, we consider both statistical and case study evidence. We use statistical analysis to capture the resourceintervention relationship based on post-WWII civil wars from Regan (2002) , the most comprehensive database of civil war interventions. Alongside the statistical evidence, we consider a number of case examples that help substantiate and contextualize the quantitative results.
The dependent variable used to test Hypothesis 1 is the occurrence of intervention into a civil war, coded dichotomously as 1 if a third party intervenes and 0 if it does not, based on Regan (2002) . The data also differentiate between intervention on the side of the government and intervention on the side of the opposition; we use that information, coded 1 for intervention on a side and 0 otherwise (for each of the sides), to test Hypothesis 2. The unit of analysis is the potential intervener, which we operationalize as any member of the international system other than the state involved in civil war (Lemke and Regan 2004) . Rather than use cross-sectional information only, our approach captures each phase of the war wherein potential interveners are coded as having new opportunities to intervene following instances of intervention by other states, which captures the actual process and evolution of the war more accurately. Using the potential intervener as the unit of analysis is the most suitable way to examine the intervener's decision-making process directly (Findley and Teo 2006, 830) , rather than only examining generally whether the probability of intervention is increased given the presence of certain contextual factors (e.g., Regan 2000, 52; Aydin 2010 ).
The set of all potential interveners creates an unreasonably large number of observations, of which many states are not likely to intervene. Thus, we need a means to separate out states that are likely to be interveners from those that are not. While we could accomplish this through some case selection rules, similar to identifying politically relevant dyads in studies of interstate war, we instead use an estimation technique that accounts for the selection of likely interveners in the first stage of the model, followed by the occurrence of actual interventions, which is the key outcome of interest.
Given the intervener selection issue and because the hypotheses posit expectations about duration until intervention, we use a split-population, or mixture-cure, survival model (Schmidt and Witte 1989; Sposto 2002 ).
The split-population model estimates the relationship between resources and intervention in two stages. It first estimates the likelihood that a state will intervene at some point during the war. In other words, the model estimates statistically whether a given state is the type that would intervene into a war or has particular incentives to get involved. Then, for the set of potential interveners likely to get involved, the model provides corrected estimates of the duration until the intervention occurs. We begin by estimating a split population model of the hazard of intervention into the war on any side. Following, we consider a competing risks model, which allows us to estimate the effect of intervention on one side of the conflict where nonintervention and intervention on the other side of the conflict are jointly the reference categories. We consider two main independent variables capturing lootable natural resources. First, to
evaluate Hypothesis 1, we use a measure of lootable resources from Lujala (2010:18-19) , which captures easily extractable diamonds as well as gems, such as rubies, sapphires, and opals that are located in the conflict zone during the conflict. Further, we then consider an alternative, which captures all diamonds and gems but also includes drugs located in conflict zones. The Lujala (2010) data is by far the most comprehensive and thus appropriate for testing H1. But unfortunately it does not contain information about which side controls the lootable resources.
To account for the control of resources and test Hypothesis 2, we use the Fearon (2004) measure of contraband that captures "evidence of major reliance by the rebels on income from production or trafficking in contraband" (Fearon 2004: 284) . His contraband measure consists specifically of lootable natural resources, such as precious gems, cocaine, and opium (284). 4 This measure allows us to consider whether rebel control of resources encourages intervention on behalf of the rebels and discourages intervention on behalf of the government.
We use a set of control variables that capture existing arguments about geopolitical factors that might motivate third-party intervention ( 
Empirical Results
We first consider whether lootable resources motivate third-party intervention on the government or opposition side, a test of Hypothesis 1. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The results in Table 1 , which rely on the Lujala (2010) measure, show that the presence of lootable resources in the conflict zone hastens the time until intervention. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant ( =1.526; p=0.01) and, substantively, there is a 65% increase in the predicted hazards. The first model (M1) includes only diamonds and gemstones and is clearly related strongly to intervention. Ideally, we would also like to consider other types of lootable resources. We thus add a measure of drugs in conflict zones to the measure of diamonds and gemstones and reestimate the model (M2). Doing so indicates that drugs, diamonds, and gems all appear to serve a similar purpose in increasing the risk or decreasing the duration until intervention. While the effect attenuates slightly, the coefficient is again positive ( =1.389) and statistically significant (p=0.017).
These results are insightful and point to a connection between resources and intervention.
We next turn to models that allow a better differentiation between who controls resources and on which side intervention is likely to occur in each such case. Table 2 displays the results using the measure of whether rebels control resources (Fearon 2004) , and it provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 2.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The expectation in Hypothesis 2 is that when rebels control resources, the hazard of intervention on the side of the opposition should increase, thus decreasing the time until intervention. Further, the hazard of intervention on the side of the government should decrease, thus taking longer for intervention to occur. The results across these two models show that the presence of natural resources hastens third-party intervention on the side of the opposition ( = 1.869; p=0.049). On the flip side, when rebels control resources, this delays intervention on the side of the government ( = -2.383; p=0.012). In both cases, the results are also substantively meaningful.
Rebel control of lootable resources increases the predicted hazard of opposition intervention by 88%, whereas it decreases the predicted hazard of government intervention by 50%.
In addition to the split-population models, we simplified the estimation to check the robustness of the model. Rather than rely on a duration model, we estimated a set of rare-events logit models of intervention on any side, on the opposition side, and on the government side.
Although this represents a deviation from the duration framework that is most appropriate for our research question, we note that the results are similarly robust. All additional models indicate positive and statistically significant relationships between lootable resources and third-party intervention.
Taken together, the results of the various statistical models offer strong support for the hypotheses that lootable resources motivate intervention into civil wars. While the results are insightful in establishing a general relationship, they cannot sort out competing mechanisms, such as whether third parties intervene to access resource markets or whether they use the resources strictly for fueling the war towards a desired end. To contextualize the results better, we investigated interventions into civil wars that appear to be connected to resources to trace how specifically the resources motivated the intervention, including discussing cases in which no resource-intervention relationship can be found.
Contextualizing the Statistical Results
In the theoretical section, we identified several ways that lootable resources could motivate intervention. They include third-party desires to access raw natural resources or the markets to those resources for purposes of profit. [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] , and during this period six countries intervened: Guinea-Bissau, the Gambia, Iraq, Libya, the US, and France (Uppsala 2008). Evidence indicates that the Gambia was motivated by illegal trade with Senegal and benefitted through this trade. It is interesting to note that Gambia actually switched sides in the Senegalese conflict to correlate with the government's loss of control over the timber market. Thus, the timber that once supported the government's military endeavors now enabled Senegalese rebels to continue thriving with direct Gambian support (Humphreys and Mohamed 2005: 286) . 6 In the private sector, furthermore, one US company, American Mineral Fields, struck a mining deal with the DRC in May of 1997, which ensured the company exclusive rights to copper and cobalt (Montague and Berrigan 2001) .
Sierra Leone is another well-known conflict in which resources were integral to the war dynamics. Of all of the countries that intervened, including Liberia, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, the UK, the US, Guinea, and the UN, diamonds certainly motivated Liberia's intervention ( The Angolan civil war (1975 Angolan civil war ( -1991 provides some evidence in favor of the argument that alluvial diamonds helped fund the rebels, which made intervention more attractive. South Africa, the United States, the DRC, and the Congo supported the rebels (UNITA), and Cuba, Namibia, the Soviet Union, Nigeria and Mozambique all directly or indirectly supported the government (Regan 2000; Fearon 2002; Akiba 1998, 104) . It is unclear to what extent most parties were interested in the diamonds, but evidence suggests that both D.R.C. and Congo intervened into Angola partially for economic reasons, consisting of the lootable resource revenues along with access to Angola's oil (Furley 2001: 96) . 8 Several cases indicate that resources motivated intervention because they provided ways for third parties to fund the combatants involved and thus increased the chances for victory. In
Afghanistan from 1978-1989, Pakistan, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Saudi Arabia all intervened (Regan 2002) , and some evidence suggests that they acted in response to the opium (Rubin 2000) , which was a source of revenue for the Mujahadeen. In particular, the U.S. supported the opium trade as it provided a way to continue involvement without over-committing the U.S.
military (Uppsala 2008; Bagley Jr. 2004; Burrough 2009 ).
As the statistical results indicate, not all wars having lootable resources attracted intervention.
In Burma, where a rich endowment of gems, opium, coca, and timber exists, it appears that only timber had a weak connection to intervention. Private Chinese citizens purchased "lucky" Ye-HtinShu trees from the rebels to support the cause, and the war resulted in increased drug production by rebel groups, but there does not appear to be any evidence linking resources to state interventions (Ross 2004a; Sam 2007) . In Indonesia, the results are similarly inconclusive with Malaysian businesses getting involved and profiting from the timber industry, though no third-party state intervention appears to have occurred for resources.
In the cases of Cambodia, India, Liberia, Nicaragua, and Turkey, there is little evidence linking resources and intervention. We could not find any evidence linking interventions into Cambodia (by Vietnam, U.S.S.R., and China) to its timber and gem resources. The same conclusion appears to apply in the case of India, in which its supply of alluvial diamonds and timber (Snyder 2006 ), likely did not attract intervention, although oil and natural gas may have (Uppsala 2008).
Control over water sources may have also encouraged Pakistan to aid insurgent movements in the Indian provinces of Jammu and Kashmir (Sahni 2006 Evidence from Colombia and Peru is somewhat ambiguous and adds an unanticipated twist into the results. In both cases, it appears that third parties did not intervene to profit from the resources or to fuel the wars (Ross 2003; , although resources may have motivated Venezuelan support (Forero 2009; Halvorssen 2008; Romero 2009 ). It is possible, however, that intervention occurred on the government side to curtail the production and flow of the drugs. The U.S.
interventions on the side of the government may have been motivated, at least in part, by the need to offset the capability that the rebels gained through drug production and trafficking (Bagley 2001; Shifter 1999 ). Thus, drugs may have been an important motive for U.S. intervention, but in ways apart from those outlined above.
Conclusion
Do lootable natural resources motivate third-party intervention into civil wars? We began by arguing that economic factors of strategic interest to third parties could be an important determinant of third-party intervention. Potential interveners find lootable resources attractive for a number of reasons including access to the resources and associated revenues for private and public reasons.
Moreover, potential interveners may see the resources as key to the dynamics and outcome of the war wherein rebel groups that have access to lootable resources may have an added measure of strength with which to counter the government.
Because of the role that lootable resources can play and their attractiveness to a variety of states, we posited that third parties should intervene more readily in conflicts. And we further argued that they should intervene more quickly on the opposition side but less quickly on the government side when rebel groups control lootable resources. We then subjected these propositions to statistical tests using a split-population (mixture-cure) survival model, followed by some exploration of a number of individual cases.
The results of the analysis show that lootable resources indeed provide a powerful incentive for third-party intervention, even after controlling for other political and strategic factors, thus underscoring the importance of economic motives for intervention. The results across all of the models are statistically significant and, furthermore, are substantively nontrivial. Evidence from a number of cases offers insights into the different mechanisms underlying the resource-intervention relationship.
The implications of these results are noteworthy. If rebels have access to some sort of lootable resource, the evidence suggests that these wars are more likely to expand. 
